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THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT

IN BANKRUPTOY, ORIGINAL AND APPELLATE-THE EXTENT
OF THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED
-STATES DISTRICT COURT IN BANKRUPTCY-THE LIMITED
SPHERE OF THE CONCURRENT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF

THE CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS, UNDER .THE PRESENT
-BANKRUPT LAW.
MUCH diversity of opinion exists touching the nature and
extent of the jurisdiction in bankruptcy of th United States
Circuit Courts, and the extent to which the jurisdiction of'the
District Courts is exclusive, under the peculiar provisions of the
Bankrupt Law of 1867:
By the .st section of the law original jurisdiction in bankruptcy is given to the District Courts, in their respective districts,
in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy ;. but this original
jurisdiction is not made, or declared to be, exclusive. The 11th
section of the law, however, in :prescribing the mode of instituting
proceedings for voluntary bankruptcy, requires all such cases in bankruptcy to originate in the District Courts. So that, in this
class of cases, which: comprehends by far the greater part (perhaps more than nine-tenths) of the cases under the Banlirupt -Law
in this country, the original jurisdiction of the District Courts if
exclusive, except so far as it may be qualified by the superintending jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. But the law contains no
such provision touching that class of cases denominated proceedVOL. XVI.--41
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ings for involuntary bankruptcy. The 2d section of the aAt
confers jurisdiction in bankruptcy on the Circuit Courts, in language comprehensive and explicit. The 39th section authorizes
proceedings by creditors for involuntary bankruptcy, and defines
the various grounds for the same ; and the 40th, 41st, and 42d
sections prescribe the mode of procedure in this class of cases,
but no express provision is made directing in which court they
shall originate or be first commenced. That appears to be left
to the election of the creditors under the jurisdiction defined and
given in the two first sections of the law. Proceedings of voluntary bankruptcy, that is, where the debtor comes in and petitions
for- his discharge, -are essentially different and distinct, both in
nature and object, from proceedings by creditors for involuntary
bankruptcy. The former are the creature of statute law and
unknown to either the common law or equity; while the latter
comprehend and accomplish the purposes of all the ordinary
remedies in chancery of creditors against fraudulent and insolvent debtors, by bill, petition, and other proper process in equity;
and. in.which the Circuit Courts had, prior to the enactment of
the Bankrupt Law, original jurisdiction. The one is intended for
the relief of the honest debtor, who, without fault on his part,
has been overwhelmed by misfortune or unavoidable commercial
disaster, the other intended to give greater efficiency to existing
equitable remedies of creditors against the frauds and fraudulent
contrivances of dishonest debtors.
The jurisdiction in bankruptcy of the Circuit Courts i derived
from the 2d and the 8th sections of the law. The latter, or 8th
section, provides for and defines the appellate jurisdiction of the
Circuit Courts ; and authorizes them to review and reverse the
judgments and orders of the District Courts "in all eases in
equity" on appeal, and "in cases at law, on writs of error," when
the amount involved exceeds $500. But the 2a section of the
law confers other and different jurisdiction on the Circuit Courts,
in the words following, to wit:"That the several Circuit Courts of the United States, within and for the districts where the proceedings in bankruptcy shall be pending, shall have a general
superintendenceand jutisdiction oF ALL CASES AND QUESTIONS arising under this

act; and except when special provision is otherwise made, may, upon bill, petition,
or other proper process, of any party aggrieved, hear and determine the case as a
court of equity. The powers and jurisdictionhereby granted may be exercised either
by said court, or by any justice thereof, in term time or vacation."
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This provision is alike comprehensive and explicit ; and the
jurisdiction conferred admits of an appropriate and just application in the judicial organization for which it was intended, without
interpolatinglimitations or qualifications by construction, but by
giving full effect to the sense and all the words of the law in the
order in which they stand, and according to their fair and ordinary import.
The jurisdiction of a court is the power to hear and determine
judiciallya matter or controversy when brought before it in due
form to invoke judicial action. Although jurisdiction may be
conferred upon a court in all cases arising under a particular
statute, or out of a particular subject-matter, yet that power or
jurisdiction cannot be exercised until a proceeding he instituted
before that court invoking its exercise. Hence, there is n6 inconsistency or contradiction in authorizing, each of several distinct
courts to hear and determine all cases, as of their originyl jurisdiction, arising 'under a particular statute.or out of a specified
,subject-matter. It is simply concurrent originaljurisdiction;
and all conflict is prevented by the established rule of judicial
action, that where a case arises, over which several distinct courts
have concuirent original jurisdictioh, that court in which the
jurisdiction first attaches, has the right tWproceed and determine
the case, unless there be some special provision made for the
transfer of the case from that court to another court having concurrent jurisdiction: Smith v. :Mcver, 9 Wheat. 532.
The different kinds of jurisdiction -known to the law, and
bearing upon the question under consideration, are the following,
to wit: original and appellate, and concurrent and exclusive. 'This jurisdiction giv.en to the Circuit Court under -the 2d seetion must-be either originalor appellate, concurrent or exclusive.
It cannot be appellate jurisdiction, for that is an appeal from the
judgment or decision of another court, and proivided for in the
8th section of this act, and it cannot take place until after a
court of original jurisdiction has previously acted. On this subject Mr. Justice STORY, in his lommentaries on -the Constitution,
Vol. I., -p. 627, said: "In reference to -judicial tribunals, an appellate jurisdiction, therefore, necessarily implies that the subject-matter has been already instituted in and acted upon

by some other court whose judgment or proceedings are to be revised. This appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and indeed, in any form
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which the legislature may choose to prescribe; -but still, the substance must exist,
before the form can be applied to it. To operate at all then under the Constitution
of the United States, it is not sufficient that there has been a decision by some oAcer or department of the United States; it must be by one clothed with judicial
authority, and acting in a judicial capacity."2

If this jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts be not appellate, it
must be original jurisdiction, and that always imports or implies
the power of the court to take cognisance of the case in the first
instance, except where special provision is otherwise made as to
its commencement. It is not, perhaps, essential to the exercise
of original jurisdiction, that the case always originate in the
court in which it is exercised. Cases originating in the state
courts are allowed to be transferred to the United States Circuit
Courts; but this only occurs in cases where the United States
courts might have taken jurisdiction in the first instance. And
the form of originating or first instituting a .proceedifig for the
exercise of original jurisdiction by a court, may of course be
subject to special and express statutory provision. The power to
hear and deteimine an original suit, although first commenced in
another court, in which no judgment had been rendered, is original jurisdiction. And although original jurisdiction implies the
authority of taking cognisance of the suit in the first instance,
yet that is not an inseparable incident, as by express provision of
law, a court ..may have the power to determine and render the
original judgment in a suit first instituted in another court.
The United States District and Circuit Courts acquire their
organic structure, and the form of their jurisdiction, from a statute
of the United States. The relation they sustain towards each
other, in the same judicial district, is of an intimate and
kindred character. In many matters they have heretofore exercised concurrent original jurisdiction ; and the district judge is
not only authorized to sit in the Circuit Court with the judge of
the Supreme Court, but also in his absence to hold the Circuit
Court. It is undoubtedly within the power of Congress to blend
to some extent the jurisdiction 9f these two courts, or even to
consolidate them. The Circuit Courts, therefore, can most clearly
be empowered to exercise what is termed original jurisdiction, in
cases first commenced, or pending, in the District Courts. And
although this may be, in one sense, concurrent, it may be in the
nature of a superintendingjurisdiction. A superintendence of
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one court, over cases originally instituted and pending in another
court, is the power of controlling and directing the action of the
latter, in the exercise of its original jfirisdiction, and is, therefore, as a matter of fact, one form of exercising original
jurisdiction.
The rule is riot to be overlooked, that remedial statutes are to
be liberally construed; and that courts are bound by the language used by the law-making power, taking the words in their
usual and ordinary meaning, and giving full scope to their signification, except so far as they are necessarily qualified by the
context, or some express l imitation in some other part of the
statute, or by some other law.
With these preliminary observations in view, especial attention
is invited to the actual import of the 1st and 2d clauses of the
2d section of the law above recited. What is the true nature
and extent of the jurisdiction here conferred on the Circuit
Court? The first clause gives " a general superintendenceand
jurisdictionof all cases and questions arising under this act."
Superintendence is the authority of oversight, direction, and control. The superintendence here authorized, is given to a judicial
tribunal-is a judicial power. - It necessarily implies the existence -of a subordinate court, in which these cases and questions
arise, over which this superifitendence is authorized. The court
is not named, hut the power will reach cases and questions in. the
District Court, or in any other tribunal which has been, or nay
hereafter be, authorize.d to administer the Bankrupt Law. It is
the superintendence exercised originally in England by the Lord
Chancellor, in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy pending
before the commissione's, and was subsequently exercised by the
court of review (after the judicial organization under the statute
1 & 2 W. 4, c. 56) over all matters pending ia the Courts of
Bankruptcy held by the commissioners under the new organization.. In England, the exercise of this superintending power was
invoked on petition or motion: 1 Chitty's Gen. Pr. 548. This
authority was only partially provided for, in the U. S. Bankrupt
o.
Law of 1841, as follows, to wit:"That the district judge may adjourn any point or question arising in any case in
bankruptcy into the Circuit Court for the district, in his discretion, to be there
heard anf determined, and for this purpose the Circuit Court of such district shall
Olso be deemed always open:" Sec. 6, U. S. Bank. Law of 1841.'
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But under the present Bankrupt Law, the power of superintendence is given in language as comprehensive as that used in the
English statute, and in addition thereto, are the words, "and
jurisdiction of all cases and questions," &c.
So, that, besides
giving the Circuit Court a general superintendence of all cases
and questions arising under this law, there is -conferred "a jurisdiction of all cases aid questions arising under the law." If the
words, " and jurisdiction,"afe to be interpreted as a mere qualification of the superintendence granted, they are superfluous and
unmeaning. For the "1general superintendence" given to the
Circuit Court, is a judicial power which is in no wise enlarged or
limited by the words "and jurisdiction."
The ordinary legal
signification of the term jurisdiction, as applied to a court, is the
authority to take judicial cognisance of a case in that court,
whereas the superintendence here given, isthe power of -direction
or control over a case, or questions arising in a case, in another
court. So, that, taking the words of the statute in the usual
sense, and giving to them their appropriate meaning, the language employed is sufficient to confer every phase of original
jurisdiction. In reference to the similar language used in the
Massachusetts Insolvent Law, the Supreme Court of that state, in
Lancaster et al. v. Choat et al., 5 Allen' R. 535, said: " This
language is broad enough to include all questions of fact as Well
as of. law, and the forms of proceeding are free from technical
restraints."
It is limited and controlled, however, by provisions
in other parts of the Insolvent Law. So, also, is the provision in
the Bankrupt 'Law, giving jurisdiction to the Circuit Court, limited or qualified by the 11th section, which requires all proceeaings of voluntary bankruptcy to originate ih the District Court.
As to these, the original jurisdiction of the Circuit Court can
only be in the nature of superintendence. But no such qualification or limitation exists as to cases of involuntary bankruptcy, as
will appear more fully hereafter.
An opinion is somewhat prevalent, that the jurisdiction given
to the Circuit Court, in the 2d section of the law, is limited to a
mere superintendence over cases and questions, which have been
passed upon in the District Court; and, that this superintendence
is virtually an exercise of mere appellate power. And this
opinion seems to be founded mainly on the mistaken impression,
that the Bankrupt Law is identical with the Insolvent Law of the
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state of Massachusetts, which contains a similar provision, in
regard to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of that state, and
which it is claimed, has been interpreted to that effect by,that
court.
Messrs. Avery & Hobbs, in their recent work on "The Bank
rupt Law," on page 8, in reference to this provision in the
2d dection of the Bankrupt Law, say:"The sixteenth section of Massachusetts Insolvent Law, General Statutes, c. 118
confers this power upon the Supreme Judicial Court Qf the state. The language
of the two acts is identical."
- ".
Under the provisions of this section, the Circuit Court, as a court of equityf
has full powers of superintendence of all cases arising in bankruptcy."

With no disposition to depreciate this highly respectable work,
it.must be acknowledged that the statement in the above extract
is inaccurate. If the language of the 'two acts he "identical,"
the Bankrupt Law must be a substantial copy of the Insolvent
Law of Massachusetts, in all its provisions. While some of the
sections of the Bankrupt Law are in part copied from the Massachusetts Insolvent Law, other sections appear to have'been taken
from the Bankrupt Law of 1841, and some from the English
Bankrupt Law. And not only is- this Bankrupt'Law applicable
to a judicial system essentially different in its organization and
the distribution of its judicial power from tha.t of this state insolvent law, but it is also essentially "ifferent in many of its material
provisions and features, touching the nature of its jurisdiction.
The Courts of Insolvency of Massachus6tts are subordinate local
courts of each county' held by the judges and registers of probate and insolvency at the shire towns of their respective counties. The relation of the Supreme Judicial Court of that state
to these local authorities forbids the idea of its.being co-ordinate,
or having concurrent jurisdiction with them ;. whereas the United
States District Court is, in the'same judicial district, a co.ordinate
tribunal, and in many things having concurrent jurisdiction, with
the Circuit Court; and in its nature and relation to the Circuit
Court essentially different from that of the local insolvency courts
of Massachusetts towards. the Supreme Court of that state. •The
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts is
not concurrent, but paramount and superintending, like that of
the Lord Chancellor of England over the courts of bankruptcy
inthat country, held by the commissioners in bankruptcy. No
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appeals are allowed in the Massachusetts law from the courts of
insolvency to the Supreme Court; but by the 84th section of the
law, an appeal is allowed to the Superior Court of the state, but
expressly limited to the simple matters of the rejection or allow
ance of the claims of creditors in the courts of insolvency. By
the 17th section all proceedings of insolvency on the application
of the debtor, are expressly required to be commenced in the
local nsolvency courts of the county; and by the 103d section
all involuntary proceedings by creditors are likewise in express
terms required to be first instituted in said local tribunals.
Very different in these, regards, as well as others, are the provi
sions of the Bankrupt Law of the United States. Here there is
no provision requiringproceediigs by creditors for involuntary
bankruptcy to be first instituted in the District Courts, And
* by the 8th section appeals fron the decisions of the Districi Courts
to the Circuit Courts are allowed in all cases in equity, and writs
of error in all cases at law, where the amount involved exceeds

6500.
These essential differences both in the structure or fundamentaL
* organization of these two different judicial systems, and in the
very material provisions of the two laws, have a most important
bearing upon the interpretation to be given to the language of
Concureach act, touching the distribution of judicial powers.
rent original.jurisdictionbeing usual and appropriate in the
relations of the United States District and Circuit Courts, is
wholly incompatible with the relation -of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts to the subordinate insolvency tribunals
of that state. While the appellate power of the United States
Circuit Court under the Bankrupt Law covers every judgment or
decision of the District Court, it .is not allowed at all from the
decisions of these local insolvency courts to the Supreme Court
)f the state, and allowed to the Superior Court only to a limited
extent. And while all proceedings under this state law are by
express terms required to be commenced in the local courts of
insolvency, the Bankrupt Law has no such provision as to proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy. It cannot, therefore, be
correctly said that either "the language of the two acts," or their
essential provisions touching the distribution of jurisdiction, are
' identical."
If the expression of these authors was intended in a restricted

IN BANKRUPTCY.

649

sense, and to be limited to the language of the 2d section of the
Bankrupt Act, as compared with the 16th section of the state
law, it is still inaccuratein point of fact .The language or words
used in the two acts in this respect are not "identical." The
Bankrupt Law gives the Circuit Court jurisdiction of all questions,.
as well as all. cases arisingunder this act, while the lvlassachusetts law gives the jurisdiction only as to "all cases arising,"
&c. This is a very material difference. Touching this distinction, Chief Justice MARSiALL, in the famous case of Jonathan
Robbins, said:-,
1." A case in law or equity was a term well understood and of
limited signification., It was a controversy between parties that
had taken a shape for judicial -decision7. If the judicial power
.xtended to every question under the Constitution, it would
involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and
decision :" 5 Wheat. .Rep., Appendix. Giving the court jurisdiction. of all 4uestions which may arise. under the Bankrupt
law, is granting a jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions
arising under the law, which can be legally presented to the court
for adjudication, however and wherever the jurisdiction may be
legally invoked.
Where the jurisdiction conferred is. ofthe general character of
a superintendence, and has reference to "cases" which the
express terms of the act have required to be first instituted in
another court, it would necessarily have to be construed as a
mere superintendingjurisdiction. And such is necessarily the
construction given to the Insolvent Law of Massachusetts. But
where.the jurisdiction conferred is denominated a jurisdiction in
addition to "a general superintendence,'" and is extended to all
questiong as well 'as cases arising under the act, how could the
court refuse to take ctognisance of any such question, when presented in due and legal form in. a case not required by the law to
be first brought in another court? Why did Congress, in copying the phraseology of the.16th section of the Massachusetts law,
deem it proper to make a change, and go 'further and extend the
jurisdiction to "all questions," as well as cases ? Was this,a
it no significaiie when
vain thing which meant nothing ? .Has
considered in connection with the fact that proceedings in bankruptcy -by creditors against insolvent and fraudulent debtors
(which was one of the ordinary subjects of the equity ju-isdc.
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tion of the Circuit Court prior to the enactment of the Bankrupt
Law) are not now, by the terms of the law, required to be first
brought in the District Court ? 'Messrs. Avery & Hobbs, on p
11 of their work above mentioned, say, on this subject:"The court will grant relief under this section in all cases
under this statute where the statute itself has not prescribeda
specific mode of relief: W'heelock v. Hastings, 4 Met. 504;
Eastman v. Foster, 8 Id. 19 ; Barnardv. Baton, 2 Cush. 294."
Under this rule, sanctioned by the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, the United. States Circuit Court can
grant relief as of its -original jurisdiction in proceedings of
involuntary bankruptcy, inasmuch as they are not by any specific
mode of relief, prescribed in the law, required to be first brought
in the District' Court.
The idea that the superintending jurisdiction utider the Massa
chusetts law had been interpreted by the Supreme Court of that
state to be appellate jurisdiction, is an entire mistake. The
decisions have been just the reverse. In Barnardv. Baton, 2
Cush. .294, the petition was presented as upon an appeal. But
the court held that they could not sustain it as an appeal, but did
sustain it as an original petition, and granted the relief. And in
Lancaster et al. v. Choate et al., 5 Allen 534, the court, in reference to this provision in the Massachusetts Insolvent Law, said:"R. is not to be regarded as an appellate jurisdiction, for such a construction of
the law would be contrary to the manifest intent pf the legislature, and the exist
ence of such a jurisdiction would create needless delays and embarrassments in
the operation of the system. Where a right of appeal -is given as in case of a
creditor whose claim is disallowed, it is given in unequivocal terms, and the appeal
is to the Superior Court: St. 1838, c. 163, § 4. 'Yet in describing the jurisdiction
of this court, and also the process by which parties miy apply to the court and its
course of proceeding thereon, the statute employs very comprehensive terms. It
is a general superintendence and jurisdiction, as a court of chancery, in all cases
arising under this act," and "in all cases which are not herein otherwise specially
provided for, upon the bill, petition, or other proper process of any party aggrieved
by any proceedings under this act, to hear and to determine the case as a court of
chancery, and to make such order or decree therein as law and justice shall
require :" St. 1838, c. 163, § 18.

The reasons assigned by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
in the same case, arising out of the peculiar nature of their local
judicial system, sufficiently show that the interpretation given to
this state Tusolvent Law can have no just application in giving a
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construction to this provision in the Bankrupt Law of the United
States. They are as follows:"The reason for making this provision so extensive is to be found in the character of the Insolvent Laws. They invest courts of inferior jurisdiction, and for
a time invested masters in chancery with an extensive power over the person, as
well as the whole estate and business of an individual alleged to be insolvent, and
interfere with the rights of his creditors, and of persons who have contracted with
him. One important object, which is expressed by the statute in respect to the
jurisdiction of this court, is to establish and maintaiti a regular and uniform course
of proceedings in 4li the different courts. Another principle, which is so important
that the legislature cannot be supposed to have overlooked it, is the right of trial
by jury. There was not and could not well be a. jury trial established in the courts
cf insolvency. The delays, perplexities, and expense incident to it wuld have
destroyed the value of the system. The- jurisdiction -conferred on. this court was
manifestly intended to meet every exigency, whether foreseen or unforeseen. If
the inferior tribunals should err as to the law or the facts, any party aggrieved was
authorized to apply to this court, by a process adapted to the nature of his case, and
might obtain aft appropriate redress. His application- does not bring the whole
case before this court, but merely the point in respect to which he is aggrieved;
and when the matter is corrected, everythin- else remains unchanged in that
court:" 5 Allen 535.

The provisions of the Insolvent Law mentioned, expressly requiring all cases, whether instituted by a debtor or by a creditor, to
be commenced in the local courts of 'insolvency, necessarily limited the operation of the language prescribing the jurisdiction.
Any provision, general in its terms, may be limited, by someother provision of the same statute affecting its operation. This.
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. of Massachusetts, which is
determined to be original jurisdiction, cannot be exercised until
after a case is instituted in the local courts of insolvency, on
account of the express provision requiring all cases to be first
commenced there. But that court has fully recognised the rule,
in the above cases cited by Messrs. Avery and Hobbs, in 4 & 8
Met- and 2d Cush., that in the exercise of this jurisdiction, it
can grant relief under all circumstances, and in all cases, where
not restrained by some other specific mode of relief prescribed iii
the statute. The same restriction operates upon the jurisdiction
given to the Circuit Court in the 2d section of the Bankrupt La4,
as to cases of voluntary bankruptcy, but not as to cases of involuntary bankruptcy, because the law has not. specifically required
them to be first instituted in the District Court.

Here the matter

stands; and upon the principles settled by the Supreme Court of
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Massachusetts, in construing the Insolvent Law, the Circuit Court
of the United States has concurrent original jurisdiction with the
District Court, in cases of involuntary bankruptcy in the first
place, and can take cognisance of such a case in its first commencement.
This view of the question is incontestably established by the
2d clause of the 2d section, which gives the Circuit Courts jurisdiction in cases comnlenced therein, " upon bill, petition, or other
proper process."
After conferring the superintendence and
jurisdiction in the first clause' in the comprehensive manner above
mentioned, the second clause follows, "1and except when special
provision is otherwise made (the Circuit Court) may, upon bill,
p6tition or. other proper process of any party aggrieved, hear
and determine the case as .a courtof equity.'.' Thez exception
here made covers-at least all cases'of voluntary bankruptcy ; for
as to these, special provision is " otherwise made," in sect.'ll,1
which requires them to be commenced in th6 District Court. The
remedy is her.e given tto any party aggrieved," in generaZ
terms,.which would reach the case of a creditor "aggrieved," by
the fraud of his debtor. To limit this provision by interpretation
to a party "aggrieved" by an erroneous proceeding in the District Court, would be interpolating a limitation, which neither its
context nor its reason required. The provision in this particular
in the MassAchusetts Insolvent Law, is different. The state
statute of 1838 contains, in this provision, the following words:
"'upon the bill, petition, or other propbr process, of any party
aggrieved 6y any proceedings under thii.act," &c.: St. 1888,
c. 168, § 16: 5 Allen 535. In the revision of the general statutes,
the words, "by any proceedings under .tlis act," appear to
have been omitted. But the court said, in the case in 5th Allen,
on page 534, that "this change ii the phraseology in the general
statute c. 118, § 16, did not change the substance of the former
provisions." The appeal allowed was to the Superior Court, and
limited to the cases of the allowance and the rejection of credit,
or's debts. And the provision expressly requiring all cases to be
first instituted in the local courts of insolvency, substantially
made the limitation, which the words omitted would make if retained. Under the Bankrupt Law, the appeal and writ of error,
provided for in the 8th section, afford ample remedies for all
grievances by erroneous proceedings after judgment in the Di§
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trict Courts; and the superintending jurisdiction given in the
first clause of section 2d, affords all the redress required for grievances arising from improper or irregular proceedings in the
District Courts prior to judgment. So that this second clause
of the section would be wholly superfluous, if limited to grievances arising from proceedings in the District Courts under this
act.
And "the case" mentioned in thb second clause of the 2d
section, which the court is to "hear and determine as a court of
equity," is, of course, "the case" made by the "1bill, petition, or
other proper process." A proceeding by bill, petition, &c., would
make a case; and, as no other case is mentioned in this .connection, the inference is irresistible that this mu'st be the case meant.
It cannot be claimed, .hat this second clause was simply intended to. prescribe the mode of procedure, to invoke judicial
action under thesuperintendence given in the first clause. That
is not -the effect or import of the language used. The manifest
object of the 2d section is to define the jurisdiction which it confdrs on the Circuit Court, and fix its- limits; and it is not the
purpose here to prescbe a mode of procedure.. No such conn.ection is expressed between the subject-matter of the provisions
of the first and second clauses. The plain impoit of the Ianguage
used in the latter clause is to confer, subject to the specified
exception, further and additionaljurisdiction ; and the character
of it is defined as a proceeding in equity "upon bill, petitioi,"
&c. The superintendence given in the first clause is, "of all
cases and questions arisingunder this act," without reference tothe -distinctionbetween cases at law and in equity, and not sib.
'ject
to the exception expressed in the second clause. * It would,
therefore, be utterly preposterous to say, that the provision of the,
second clause was intended to prescribe the mode of procedure
for the superintending jurisdiction given in the first clause.
Subject to the exception as a' mere mode of procedure, for the
cases and questions of the superintending jurisdiction, it would
not probably apply to .the one-tenth part of them.
The fact that the Bankrupt Law has specifically required - ah
cases of voluntary bankruptcy, to be brought in the Distric"
Courts, but contains no such requirement asto cases of involuntary bankruptcy, implies that the latter were left to the concur
rent original jurisdiction of the Circuit and the District Courts
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Why was express provision made requiring the one of these two
classes of cases to be brought in the District Courts, and none
such made as to the other ? It is true, that prior to the Bankrupt Law, no proceedings by debtors for their discharge from the
obligations of their creditors existed,'in the Federal courts ; but
proceedings upon bill, petition, and other proper process, by creditors, on account of the fraudulent devices, concealments, and
conveyances of failing and absconding debtors, did exist, and
could previously be maintained in the Federal courts; and consti•tuted one of the important remedies within the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court. When a creditor residing in one state sought
redress for the frauds of his debtor in another state, it was
deemed important to afford him the benefit of the jurisdiction of
the united States Circuit Courts. Is it reasonable to presume,
that Congress intended to deprive the citizens of the different
states of the advantage of this original jurisdiction of the Circuit.
Courts ? The Bankrupt Law supersedes these previous remedies
in equity. And had it been intended to strip the Circuit Court
of thin important jurisdiction, for the relief of creditors, against
the fraudulent conduct of failing debtors, it is fair to presume,
that an express provision would have been made in the Bankrupt
Law touching this class of cases as well as those of voluntary
bankruptcy.
It has been .argued, that the language of the 2d section, which
comes immediately after that part of the section above recited, is'.
inconsistent with the position here insisted on, and which is as
follows: "Said Circuit Courts shall also -have concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts of the same district, of all suits
at law or in equity, which may or shall be .brought by or against
the assignee in bankruptcy," &c. This is an argument founded"
upon emphasis, and assumes that the emphasis is on the word
"concurrent," thereby implying that the jurisdiction defined in
the previous part of this section was not concurrent jurisdiction.
But if the emphasis' should be placed on the word "al so" instead
of the word " concurrent," the implication is equally as strong
the other way, that is, that the jurisdiction defined in the second
clause, which is the next preceding clause of the section, is eonZeurrent jurisdiction. And the only way to determine on which
of these words .to place the emphasis, is first to ascertain the
kind of jurisdiction defined in the preceding clause. Now, it
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having been incontestably established, that the jurisdiction conferred by the next preceding clause, "upon bill, petition, &c., in
:.quity," is in fact original jurisdiction,: and, therefore, concurrent, the emphasis must be placed on the word " also," and thus,
by implication, it sustains the true interpretation of the language
used.
Again, it has been urged, that the language of the first section
of the law, declaring that "1the several District Courts are constituted courts of bankruptcyl" is incompatible with the position
here taken. What is meant by constituting the District Courts
of the United States" courts of bankruptcy ?" Does this phraseology invest these courts with jurisdiction in bankruptcy ? If
so, the language of the statute, which immediately follows it,
is idle and superfluous; for it grants to the District Courts
specifically and in express terms original jurisdiction in bankruptcy, and 'par.ticularly authorizes them to hear and determine
upon all matters in bankruptcy according to the provisions of this
act, and, further, expressly extends the jurisdiction to all the
miatters and proceedings in detail of a case in bankruptcy, ",until
the final distribution and settlement of the estate of the bankrupt."
Why all this particularity in conferring on the "District Courts
their jurisdiction, if constituting them "courts of bankruptcy"
importe& exclusive original'jurisdiction of all matters in bankruptcy ?. Originally in England, the courts of bankruptcy were
such as were held by the commissioners designated in 'the Lbrcl
Chancellor's- commissions. The original jurisdiction was first
entertained by the Lord Chancellor on the petition of tle creditor,
and after the commission in bankruptcy was granted, the proceedings were conducted before the commissioners under the superintendence and control.of the Lord Chancellor. Under the statute
of 1 & 2 W. 4, c.56, a judicial organization was, effected, termed
"The Court of Bankruptcy,"- composed of four judges and six
*commissioners, and declared to be "a court of.record of law and
equity." The judges (afterwards reduced in number) .held .wha#,
was termed "the Court of Beview," and the commissioners' held
what were termed "the Courts of Bankruptcy," under the supdrintendence of the Court of Review; administering the Bankrupt
Law, in all its details of adjusting the claims of creditors, and
settling the estate of the bankrupt. But.under this change in the
organization of the bankrupt courts, the original jurisdiction
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began upon the petition of the creditor brought before the Lord
Chancellor, and the *issue of the fiat on his authority from the
Court of Chancery. Exclusive original jurisdiction was never
claimed for the courts held by the commissioners, on account of
their being constituted " courts of bankruptcy." That peculiar
denomination was given to them, because, they were especially
charged with the administration of the Bankrupt Laws, in the
details of the adjustment of the claims of creditors, and the settlement of the estates of bankrupts. And constituting the District Courts of the United States, " Courts of Bankruptcy" cannot be taken as importing anything more than this.
- The language- of the first section, which gives the District
Courts original jurisdiction, "in all matters and proceedings in
Baukruptcy,'4 0&.,and "extends it to all cases and controversies
arising between the-bankrupt and any creditor or creditors," &c.,
does not import that it is exclusive. It is the ordinary language
used in defining the jurisdiction of a court with which that of
another tribunal may be concurrent. It extends the authority of
the court to all matters and cases, in which its judicial power is
to be exercised, when a proceeding is instituted invoking its
action. The language employed does not preclude the exercise
of concurrent jurisdiction by another court touching the same
matters, when .upon a proper proceeding it may be called. into
action. When a statute is intended to confer exclusive. jurisdictioxi, words must be used which clearly import that meaning and
intent. The District Courts are made- courts of exclusive jurisdiction in some matters, but the language, of-the statute used to
effectuate this is explicit and unequivocal, as follows, to wit:
"The District Courts shall have exclusive .original cognisance of
all civil causes of admiralty and. maritime jurisdiction," &c. :
shall have also exclusive original cognisance of all seizures on
land," &c.: "and shall also have jurisdiction, exclusively of the
courts of the several states, of all suits against consuls," &c.:
See Brightly's Dig. U. S. Laws 230 and 231; 1 vol. U. S. Stat.
at Large, p. 76, § 9. Had it been the intention of the lawmaker,
to make the original jurisdiction of the District Courts exclusive
in all these matters in bankruptcy, to which it was extended in
the first section, some such explicit language as that above mentioned would undoubtedly have been used.
The language of the Bankrupt Law of 1841, which prescribed
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the jurisdiction of the District Courts, is not substantially different from that in which the jurisdiction of that court is defined
in the present Bankrupt Law ; but the language used to confer
the jurisdiction on the Circuit Court, in the Bankrupt Law of
1841, is by no means as comprehensive and explicit as that of the
law of 1867. .And yet it was decided, that" the jurisdiction of
the District Court, under that law, was not exclusive," but that
"the Circuit Courts had concurrent jurisdiction of any matter
arisingunder the Bankrupt Law, when 'the subject-matter was
proper for a court of equity, and the parties such as the constitution and laws of the United States require :" Lucas v. Morris,
1 Paine's U. S. Gircuit Court Rep. 396. It is reported to have
been.held, McLean v. The Lafayette Bank, 3 McLean's Rep.
185: "That, in all cases arising under thd Bankrupt Law (of
1841), the Circuit Courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the
District Courts." And in the case of McLean v. Meline et al,
8 McLean's Rep'. 199, it was held, "that the Circuit Court had
jurisdiction in the case of a bill filed to set'aside a conveyance
of effects made in contemplation of bankruptcy, to set aside the
'transfer, direct the liens to be paid pro rata, and the property
not levied upon to be distributed among the efcditors of the
Uankrupt." And in the recent work of Mr. Edwin James, on the
Bankrupt Law of the United States of 1867, the author, in his
notes, on page 12, says:"Within and for the district where proceedings in bankruptcy are pending,the
Circuit Courts have concurrent jurfsdiction of all cases and questions in administration of bankruptcy under the act, as courts of equity; and have concurrentjurisdiction ifi all cases at law and in equity, .to which the assignees, as plaintiffs' or
defendants, arie parties, and in all matters concerning the estate and property of
the bankrupt, vested in .or claimed by them. The Circuit Courts of the United
States have jurisdiction, under the Bankrupt Law, to set aside the transfer of property by the bankrupt in fraud of the law, and in the same proceeding, to direct
that such property be distributed according to their legal rights among- creditors
having valid liens thereon.'

The argument ab inconvenienti has been urged against the
exercise of this jurisdiction by the Circuit Court. When the
language of a statute is. sufficient to confer clearly the jurisdiction, so that to deny it would render. a part of the language used
unmeaning and superfluous, the argument drawn from inconvenience may prove want of wisdom in the lawmaker, but it cannot
justify judicial legislation: Smith on Constitutional and StatuVOL. XVI.L-42
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tory Construction, p. 632; Broom's Legal Maxims 140 and cases
cited. But is there any foundation' in fact for this argument ?
This original jurisdiction is limited to cases of involuntary bankruptcy; and the proportion of them, which will seek this jurisdiction in the first place, will not probably exceed the number of
cases in equity in the Circuit Court by creditors on account of
the frauds of debtors, if no bankrupt law existed. And with
the judicial aids provided by the Bankrupt Law for all cases in
bankruptcy, by means of assignees, registers, &c., the Circuit
-Court could have no more difficulty. in the adjustment of the
claims of creditors, and collecting and distributing assets, than in
the case of a creditor's bill, setting aside fraudulent transfers,.
marshalling assets and distributing the same, &c. In cases of
involuntary bankruptcy the important contest in the litigation
occurs prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy. After.the adjudication the Circuit Court need have no further trouble in disposing of the case than by its superintending jurisdiction in cases in
the District Court. But the District Court being constituted "a
court of bankruptcy," and as such charged with all matters and
proceedings in adjusting the claims of creditors, and settling the
affairs of the bankrupt, a case in the Circuit Court, after the
adjudication in bankruptcy, could very properly, under the very
liberal provisions and ample authority in the law for regulating
the practice 'byrules of court, be sent to the District Court as
"the court of bankruptcy," for the balance of the proceedings.
No inconvenience to the Circuit Court *as found in the exercise
of its concurrent jurisdiction, under the Binkrupt Law of 1841.
The utility and necessity of this jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court is certainly greater now than was the. chancery jurisdiction
afforded to creditors prior to 'the -Bankrupt Law. Lord HARDWICKE is reported to have said: "The new laws relating to bankruptcy have turned the edge of commissions of bankruptcy from
being as they were originally, remedial to the creditor and in the
nature of punishment to the bankrupt, whom they considered as
an offender, to be the accidental occasion of great frauds:"
Smith, Mont. Dig. 119; Hilliard on Bankruptcy, § 5. One
object of the chancery jurisdiction mentioned was to afford creditors in another state a jurisdiction supposed to be less liable to
be controlled by local influences than the court held exclusively by
1h6 local district judges. The subtlety of overreaching debtors,

